The international UK based NGO Conciliation Resources funded Karabakh, a film on the the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh after the 1988 to 1994 war.
What makes this film unique is that the film is co-directed by a Georgian and an Abkhazian.
You can download the film here.
Rumor has it that the inspiration for A Hacks Guide To Writing Articles About Putin was this article published in the The Moscow Times.
Moscow Traffic: The Cost of Authoritarianism
By Anders Åslund, Peterson Institute
Op-ed in the Moscow Times
January 7, 2007© The Moscow Times
Moscow's traffic jams are presumably the worst in the world at present. They show Russia's fundamental problem. Materially, the middle class has grown strong, but a small ruling elite disregards the rest of the population. Karl Marx would have said that the economic base has outgrown the political superstructure. Ultimately, Moscow's traffic jams show how badly Russia needs democracy.
For years, the Moscow traffic has been getting ever worse. On the last day of October, it came to a complete standstill for six hours from four to ten p.m. An underlying cause is Russia's impressive economic boom, but many countries have enjoyed an annual growth of 7 percent or more for a decade, though only a few have suffered as badly as Moscow. Examples that stand out are Teheran and Lagos during their oil booms in the 1970s and Bangkok in its 1990s boom.
When I drove in Moscow 20 years ago, congestion was unknown. The normal speed in the city center was 100 km/h, and you could park anywhere. The Soviet Union was not a mass consumption society but an elite society, with cars and roads reserved for the elite. Moscow had only about 300,000 cars. The masses were relegated to collective transportation in the underground, and bicycles were even prohibited in the city center.
When Russia introduced a market economy in 1992, the government stopped limiting the supply of cars to the people through rationing, extreme protectionism, and exorbitant taxes. Muscovites could choose for themselves, and they wanted cars as everybody else in the world. Today, Moscow has over 3 million cars.
But the government has not adjusted to the new situation. The reason is not economic, but political. As Russia's democratization was never more than partial, and now gone altogether, the government serves the elite rather than the people, and the traffic police form a loyal cog in the authoritarian wheel. Its foremost function is to keep the roads clear for top state officials. Often traffic lights are being turned off, because some official wants to travel freely. For the president, roads can be closed for a couple of hours. Nobody counts the social or individual cost of traffic disruptions.
A stark illustration is the morning traffic on Rublyovskoe Shosse. One morning, I drove in the opposite direction of this traffic lout of Moscow. Hundreds of privileged equipages sparred with one another, trying to figure out who had the highest status and what concrete benefits they could extract for themselves in this truly Hobbesian world. The only surprise was that no bodyguards started shooting, but that might soon be the case.
The catalyst of the November standstill was that many of roads in the city center had been closed because the president of Angola visited Moscow, and the Russian president wanted to move freely with his guest. A spokeswoman of the traffic police declared that this is done all over the world, which is not true. In addition, she flatly denied that the jam had been that bad. Finally, she alleged that the drivers themselves were at fault.
That is the case in point. The Russian police take no responsibility for order. In a democracy, the traffic police are supposed to assist the population by bringing order and reducing traffic deaths. In Russia, by contrast, the traffic police care little about speeding, drunken driving, and ultimately death. Consequently, Russia has one of the highest rates of traffic death in the world. In the same way, the ordinary police do not care about the homicide rate, rendering Russia's murder rate one of the highest in the world. Ministers' sons are welcome to run over innocent people when drunk.
Instead, after they have taken care of top officials, the Russian traffic police are allowed to enrich themselves through extortion, thus manifesting the superiority of the state over society. A drunk or speeding driver might have to pay a higher bribe than otherwise, but he may continue his dangerous voyage. Many countries have cameras that objectively record speeding and driving against red lights. All orderly countries have introduced systems in which all fines must be paid via bank transfer or with checks, while policemen must never be paid in cash.
Today, Russia has an eminently functioning payment system, and the prevailing extraction of cash payments by policemen shows nothing but the government's acceptance of their corruption and disregard for the lives of ordinary citizens. The old Soviet kleptocracy, which allowed officials to steal as long as the stealing was moderate, is still kept alive.
In the last few years, Russia has renamed the traffic police, and they have received huge new resources, but traffic deaths are not declining while the traffic jams are becoming ever worse, because the tasks of the traffic police have not changed. The reason is not that it is particularly difficult but official disinterest. Many other post-Soviet countries have successfully reformed the traffic police.
An old Soviet artifact is police posts on the borders of all oblasts. They were set up to control that unauthorized people, such as kolkhoz peasants and foreigners, did not move around the country. They have no role to play in a free society, but as long as they persist, the policemen at hand will inevitably indulge in extortion. Several post-Soviet countries have abolished these police posts. President Akaev did so in Kyrgyzstan and Yushchenko did the same as prime minister in 2000. In Ukraine the abolition of these police posts freed trade within the country that remains so encumbered in Russia. In Georgia President Saakashvili drew the logical conclusion and abolished the entirely harmful traffic police altogether.
With the renewed rise of state power in Russia, the number of privileged people with blue lights and escorts has increased to many thousands. Do not believe that any administrative regulation will reduce their number. In Ukraine, by contrast, these notorious pseudo-official convoys have almost disappeared with democracy, for all but the president and the prime minister. Even they do not have all traffic lights turned off as President Kuchma still did.
Even an ideal police could not bring order to Moscow's traffic. The whole policy has favored the interests of the elite at the expense of the population. Why do you have to drive several kilometers before you are allowed to turn to the left? Why are road works allowed to block so many roads for such a long time? Why are wrongly parked cars allowed to block both pavements and streets? Why have international traffic planners not been invited to sort out the mess? Only recently attempts have been made to coordinate traffic lights.
The same is true of the investment policy. Why has Moscow so few multilevel crossings? Why are so few parking houses being built? How could anybody build the Manege shopping center without providing any parking spaces?
The obvious answer to all these questions is that the elite does not care about the population because power in Russia comes from the president, not from the people.
Next time you get stuck in the Moscow traffic, think about it! Can the Kremlin (forget the emasculated city hall!) solve Moscow's traffic problem without listening to the people? I do not think so. The ultimate cause of Moscow's horrendous traffic jams is the arrogance of power. A modern complex society needs the feedback from its population to grow strong. As in a Marxian farce, the new Russian authoritarianism is recreating the mistake of the Soviet Union: to build a system that is too centralized and rigid to be able to function in a modern society.
Peter Lavelle of Russia Today on August 22, 2007 posted the following on his blog regarding the Georgian-Russian missile crisis:
Russia-Georgia: “Missilegate”
August 22, 2007, 18:16
I watched with great interest comments made by Russia’s ambassador to the UN – Vitaly Churkin – regarding Russia’s investigation into the missile “found” by the Georgian authorities. He proved, as far as I am concerned, that the whole story is made up. Georgia, still again, is resorting to provocations to gain international attention. And it worked, but probably less so, than hoped for by the Georgians.
I ask readers a simple question and I am interested in replies: What interest does Russia have in provoking Georgia? The status quo in the frozen conflicts is unsettling for many involved, but least there is peace.
What is in play? Are the Georgians seeking to change the status quo at home? Provoking Russia could be part of the game. And let’s remember that Georgia has elections soon. Blaming all domestic woes on a foreign enemy is a common trick.
What are your thoughts?
I left the following comment:
Russia has lots of interest in provoking Georgia.
Russia wishes to spread it's influence back into the FSU and an independent, western oriented Georgia simply sets a bad precedent. That in itself would be enough, but with a Georgia that is in Russia's orbit the golden prize, Azerbaijan becomes much more attainable.
Russia wants to be the guarantor of stability in the region, but to do that it has to often resort to seeding instability when their help is declined. Sort of like a protection racket on a geopolitical level.
This isn't far fetched, this characterizes Russian policy with Georgia since the country's Independence.
This does not prove they did anything, but does address your claim that Russians don't have their motivations for provocation.
As you rightfully point out, the Georgians have their motivations too. Certainly bad relations with Russia are helping justify Georgia's continuing re-orientation to the west and many people in the Government must surely be interested in maintaining the idea that Georgia has no choice in this matter. Also it's easy to imagine that certain business sectors must be profiting from the border closure, and they must have a vested interest in sabotaging any detente (I know this sounds a bit conspiratorial, but sometimes i think that the changes since the "Rose Revolution" can't have run all deep yet - can we really assume that the culture of the USSR and the Schevernadze years can be eradicated in a so quickly?).
Still, the Georgians are far from stupid, and such a move by anyone in Georgia would be extremely risky. Though western orientation in Georgia is very popular, Georgians (like people in other democracies) are a fickle bunch: such adventurism if it did in fact occur and it were it to become public, would surely backfire.
One thing I am sure of: if the Russians wanted to bomb something, they wouldn't have made a mess of it like this. This means that if the Russians did it, it was either an accident, it was their intent to either draw the Georgians into overreaching politically, or they were interested in what Georgia's reaction would be.
This last possibility is interesting: Georgia of late has been making some overtures to Russia and Russia could be interested in seeing what these overtures translate to in practical terms. To what extent would the Georgians cover it up? It's very possible the Russians dropped the "missile" intentionally but without arming it.
The other thing I am sure of is this: if it was a real accident there is no way the Russians would admit it (especially if the south Ossetians were involved as some have suggested - wouldn't that be a treat for the Saakashvili government?).
In my view, grossly simplified statements, like you made (for the most part devoid of facts) brings into questions your political motivations. Why is it that support for Russia has to be encompass all off Russia's inane policies and decisions? Why is that Westerners who appreciate Russia feel they have to emulate even the worst aspects of Russia?
I count myself as an enthusiastic Russophile, but I see no reason to become a Kremlin mouthpiece.
A few weeks ago my friends Nino and Gogita invited me to Kobuleti for a little mini vacation.
Nino is the pregnant one in the car...
The scenery in Adjara (Kobuleti is in Adjara) is absolutely breathtaking! It's subtropical and the greenest landscape I've ever seen. It looks in real life what the rest of the world looks like when photographed using Fuji Velvia film.
The day after we got there, Nino and Gogita took me to this restaurant hanging on the side of a mountain.
Notice the bottle empty pitcher of wine and the soon-to-be empty bottle of vodka on the table?
Well, they might explain why I suddenly decided why I had to climb...
...this waterfall behind our table.
So far so good...
... but it's amazing how much harder it is to go down than up.
Still, I did make it – even if I was a bit more sober than when I started.
If you looking for a place to stay in Kobuleti, I recommend the Green House Hotel. It's owned by Nino's father.
As you may have heard Georgia is accusing Russia of having violating it's airspace and firing (or jetisoning) a misile onto Georgian territory.
This is what the Press Secretary of the Embassy of Russia in Washington had to say on the matter:
Unjustly accusing Russia
Washington Post, August 15
Regarding the Aug. 9 editorial "Russian Aggression? Another missile attack in the Republic of Georgia":
The government of Russia has clearly communicated its position on the recent events in Georgia through official statements that the editorial ignored.
Russia supports a bilateral approach to clarifying this situation based on unbiased information. The Post editorial left the impression that there is overwhelming evidence to support Georgia's claims and that Russia is clearly to blame for the missile attack. This could not be further from the truth.
Sadly, we've seen this before. In May, The Post published an editorial and a column accusing my government of launching cyber-attacks against Estonia, presenting unsubstantiated accusations as fact. Last week it was reported -- though not in your paper -- that an Israeli security expert concluded that the attacks on Estonian computer systems were carried out by an "Internet mob" and not a foreign government. Russia denied involvement in these events all along, but The Post preferred to jump to its own conclusions.
Your audience deserves better than the half-truths and biased reporting it generally receives when it comes to Russia.
Alexey G. Timofeev
Press Secretary, Embassy of Russia
Washington
This is what the International Group of Experts (lGE) investigation reported:
Report from the International Group of Experts investigating the possible violations of Georgian airspace and the recovered missile near Tsitelubani, Georgia, 6 August 2007
August 14
The International Group of Experts (lGE) investigating the possible violations of Georgian airspace and the recovered missile near Tsitelubani, Georgia, 6 August 2007, has developed this report. The report has been agreed upon by the IGE participants of all four nations (Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden, USA)
Background
On 6 August 2007, Georgian authorities reported three violations of their airspace. During the last violation, it was reported that the violating aircraft launched a missile that impacted in a field near Tsitelubani, Georgia.
On 7 August 2007, a Joint Monitoring Team (JMT) consisting of military observers representing the Russian Federation, the Republic ofNorth Ossetia Alania and Georgia together with an officer ofthe Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Mission conducted interviews to verify the information given by Georgian officials. The group visited the missile impact site and two observation posts in the area to interview eye witnesses. The group released a report ("The Report of the Joint Monitoring Group"). Later the OSCE released a report based on the monitoring ("Spot Report: Tsitelubani missile incident").
Georgia called for an independent international investigation and four countries responded by sending eight technical and operational experts to form the International Group of Experts (IGE). The countries were Latvia (1), Lithuania (2), Sweden (2) and the USA (3).
The work
The IOE worked from 12 to 14 August 2007. The IGE reviewed the JMT report, the OSCE report and the radar information. On 13 August, the IOE visited the missile impact site and the surveillance radar in the vicinity of Gori. The IOE inspected the debris ofthe missile at the Ministry ofInterior. The IGE also visited the Georgian Air Force (GAF) Air Base to inspect the GAF's Su-25 aircraft. Finally, the IGE visited the Joint Forces Command to review recorded radar information of the events.Findings
Based on the facts found by the IGE and the JMT and OSCE reports, the IGE has made the following findings:
- An unidentified aircraft flew from Russian airspace (close to the city of Stepansminda) into Georgian airspace and back again into Russian airspace three times. Every pass was conducted by a single aircraft. The first pass into Georgian airspace lasted less than a minute. The final two passes into Georgian airspace lasted significantly longer and the unidentified aircraft went deeper into Georgian airspace. These two passes took place at approximately 14.13 to 14.24 and 14.31 to 14.42 on 6 August 2007 (all times are GMT). During the last pass into Georgian airspace, the aircraft penetrated as far south as approximately N 42° 04', E 44° 15'.
- A missile impacted in a field close to the village of Tsitelubani at N 42° 02' 12.25", E 44° 15' 32.40". The warhead did not explode and the missile had burn marks on the rocket motor nozzle. The IGE identified the missile as a Russian designed Kh-58 (AS-II KILTER) anti-radiation missile.
- Several eye witnesses saw an aircraft in the area of the impact around 14.30-15.00 GMT. Some witnesses say they saw an object leaving an aircraft with a trail of smoke. Radar information of the last pass into Georgian airspace (around 14.36) indicates that an object separated from the unidentified aircraft.
- The IGE was unable to identify aircraft type or origin.
- The Georgian Air Force (GAF) does not possess aircraft equipped with or able to launch Kh-58 missiles. The GAF does not operate aircraft able to fly the profile flown by the unidentified aircraft.
- The IGE has not been able to verify statements concerning a second impact.
- The IGE has not been able to verify statements concerning a MANP AD being fired at the unidentified aircraft.
Tbilisi, Georgia, 14 August 2007
